Why Secret Intelligence Fails

Michael Turner argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself. Intelligence that has gone awry affects national decision making and, ultimately, American national security. Intelligence officials are reluctant to talk about intelligence successes, claiming "the secret of our success is the secret of our success." But these officials also shy away from talking about failures, largely because doing so would expose the failings of American intelligence and have an impact on policy consumers who may become more reluctant to accept and act on the intelligence they receive. Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach, beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them. Turner explores each step of the intelligence cycle - priority setting, intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination - to identify the "inflection points" within each stage that contribute to intelligence failures. Finally, he examines a variety of plans that, if implemented, would reduce the likelihood of intelligence failures. While examining the causes of intelligence failures, Turner also explores intelligence as a critical governmental activity, making the book an excellent primer on secret intelligence. Turner writes in jargon-free prose for the informed reader interested in foreign policy and national security policy matters and brings enough depth to his subject that even experts will find this a must-read. Why did I write this book? I thought it was the right time to do so. Unfortunately, intelligence officials and policymakers often ignore, or at least downplay, intelligence failures. Yet, intelligence that goes awry affects national decisionmaking and, ultimately, American national security. Little is known about the causes of intelligence failures, in part because intelligence officials and their policy consumers are reluctant to talk about them. There is a saying in the United States intelligence community that the media and the public trumpet intelligence failures while ignoring intelligence successes. This would be true if the public knew as much about intelligence successes as it does about intelligence failures. However, the public does not know, largely because intelligence officials are reluctant to talk about intelligence successes, often claiming, "the secret of our success is the secret of our success." These people also shy away from talking about failures because doing so would expose the failings of American intelligence and have an impact on policy consumers who may become more reluctant to accept and act on the intelligence they receive. This, in turn, has consequences for the US intelligence community, whose legitimacy and funding depends, at least, on the appearance of making a difference in national decisionmaking. There is no doubt that intelligence provides benefits to national policymaking, and doing so efficiently requires coping with the problems associated with intelligence failures. Dealing with the phenomenon of intelligence failures, in turn, requires an understanding of their causes. This book is a modest try at filling this gap. I am fortunate to have been a practitioner of the craft of intelligence. I spent a big chunk of my adult life in intelligence, and I learned much about the intricacies of intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, to which the public rarely, if ever, is exposed. I also have had the privilege of studying the complexities of American intelligence as a scholar, an outsider. The two perspectives - of the insider and the outsider - have given me a complete picture of the workings of U.S. intelligence. What follows, then, is a distillation of many years of work and study. American intelligence is a vast, complex, and expensive enterprise, with tremendous strengths and distinctive flaws. This book focuses mainly on the flaws, in large measure because they are the harbingers of failure. Identifying the root causes, however, does not guarantee remedial actions or future success. The frustrating part in writing a book like this is having to conclude that there is really little that can be done about intelligence failures, because their root causes are firmly embedded in the intelligence process itself. Corrective actions can only serve to streamline the process. The best one can hope for is to minimize the chances of intelligence failures by employing America's considerable intelligence resources to collect timely and relevant intelligence information and for national leaders to employ that intelligence in the making of wise and sound policy.