Oil Wealth and Federal Conflict in American Petrofederations

Oil wealth and Federal Conflict in American Petrofederations documents the critical relationship between oil rents and federal conflicts, illustrated with six representative cross-regional case studies. Each case study discusses encompasses qualitative, quantitative and comparative elements under a common structure. With each petrofederation ranging in conflict types and modalities, the work as a whole identifies key differences including oil rent decentralization (in terms of resource property, sector management and distribution of revenues); sectoral importance (considered at national and subnational levels); and federation redistribution policy (in terms of fiscal federal imbalance, fiscal equalization, and oil rent use for regional equity). Collectively, it generalizes a consistent theory of causality between oil rents and federal conflicts that take into account systemic variables. Its conclusions serve as a guide for researchers and policymakers seeking pathways to translate oil rents into development and stability. Reviews the intimate relationship between the oil sector and its governance in the political systemProvides comparative analysis of the regulation, political institutions, rent decentralization, sectoral importance, and rents redistributive policy of the oil sectorGeneralizes approaches to the causality between oil rents and federal conflicts, including implications for policymakers